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The perils of semi-presidentialism. Are they exaggerated? 
 
There is a standard academic consensus that semi-presidentialism is 
perilous for new democracies. In particular, this is because semi-
presidential countries run the risk of experiencing difficult periods of 
‘cohabitation’ between a president and a prime minister who are opposed 
to each other, and because they may also experience periods of divided 
minority government that encourage the president to rule by decree and 
subvert the rule of law. This article examines the evidence to support these 
two arguments. We find very few cases of cohabitation in young 
democracies and only one case where cohabitation has directly led to 
democratic collapse. By contrast, we find more cases of divided minority 
government and more cases where it has been associated with democratic 
failure. However, we also find that young democracies have survived 
divided minority government. We conclude that, to date, there is 
insufficient evidence to support the long-standing and highly intuitive 
argument that cohabitation is dangerous for new democracies. There is 
more evidence to support the much newer argument about the dangers of 
divided minority government. Even so, more work is needed in this area 
before we can conclude that semi-presidentialism is inherently perilous. 
 
Most academic observers agree that, like presidentialism, semi-presidentialism is 
a problematic regime type for newly-democratising countries and that 
parliamentarism should be preferred ahead of it. For example, in the early 1990s 
Linz stated that: “In view of some of the experiences with [semi-presidentialism] 
it seems dubious to argue that in and by itself it can generate democratic 
stability”.1 More than a decade later many writers echo Linz’s judgment. For 
example, Lijphart has recently written that semi-presidential systems “represent 
only a slight improvement over pure presidentialism”2 and states that 
“parliamentary government should be the general guideline for constitution 
writers in divided societies”.3 For his part, Valenzuela has argued that semi-
presidentialism “may not solve some of the inherent problems of 
presidentialism, and indeed could make them worse by reifying the conflict 
between two state powers and personalizing them in the figure of the president 
and the prime minister”.4 If these observers are correct, then democratizing 
countries would do well to avoid semi-presidentialism. Paradoxically, though, to 
date there has been no systematic cross-national study of the performance of 
semi-presidentialism. Instead, studies have tended to focus on semi-
presidentialism in particular regions.5 This article aims to fill that gap. We do not 
aim to compare the performance of semi-presidentialism relative to 
presidentialism and parliamentarism. Instead, we seek to examine whether there 
is empirical evidence to support the specific arguments that are made against 
semi-presidentialism. In this sense, we aim to establish whether semi-
presidentialism is as perilous as the scholarly consensus would suggest. 
We begin with a definition of semi-presidentialism and identify a list of 
semi-presidential regimes. We then briefly outline the three main objections to 
semi-presidentialism. They are that, like presidentialism, the direct election of the 
president encourages populist candidates who, if elected, often consider 
themselves to be above the law; that semi-presidentialism can lead to 
destabilizing periods of ‘cohabitation’ between the president and the prime 
minister – this is the most well-known argument against semi-presidentialism; 
and, finally, that semi-presidentialism is particularly vulnerable to collapse 
during periods of ‘divided minority government’ as presidents are encouraged 
to rule by decree – this is a more recent claim. Given they are specific to semi-
presidentialism, we focus on the last two objections. We find that: first, there 
have been only three examples of cohabitation in partial democracies and only 
one case where it has directly led to the collapse of the democratization process; 
second, in full democracies cohabitation has never been associated with 
breakdown, even in the very early years of such democracies; third, relative to 
cohabitation, there are more examples of divided minority government and more 
cases where it has been associated with democratic failure in partial democracies; 
fourth, while there is an equal number of cases where divided minority 
government has not led to breakdown of such democracies, these cases have 
been associated with a dangerous personalization of the political process; fifth, in 
full democracies divided minority government has never led to democratic 
breakdown, or even a decline in status from a full democracy to a partial 
democracy. The article concludes by arguing that the most well established 
argument against semi-presidentialism remains largely unfounded. Instead, 
attention should focus on the more recent argument that semi-presidentialism is 
vulnerable during periods of divided minority government, particularly in 
systems which the presidency has been a strong political actor from the start. 
 
What is semi-presidentialism and where is it found? 
 
The original definition of semi-presidentialism was provided by Duverger. He 
stated that: 
[A] political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the 
constitution which established it combines three elements: (1) the 
president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he 
possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, 
however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive 
and governmental power and can stay in office only if the 
parliament does not show its opposition to them.6 
The problem with this definition is the issue of what should count as “quite 
considerable” presidential powers. Different people make different judgment 
calls. As a result, the list of semi-presidential regimes varies from one person to 
next. For their part, Stepan and Skach identify two semi-presidential regimes – 
France and Portugal – in their study of regime-type performance.7 By contrast, 
Shugart recently identified 26 semi-presidential countries and implied that the 
list was not exhaustive.8 To the extent that the list of semi-presidential countries 
varies from one writer to the next, often like is not being compared with like. For 
example, if a writer includes only semi-presidential countries where the 
president and prime minister have equal powers and, hence, the inherent 
likelihood of intra-executive conflict is high, then we should not be surprised 
when the conclusion is drawn that semi-presidentialism is associated with intra-
executive conflict and should be avoided. By contrast, if a writer includes semi-
presidential countries where the president has fewer powers and the prime 
minister is the dominant actor and, therefore, the likelihood of intra-executive 
conflict is much lower, then we would, by definition, expect the association 
between semi-presidentialism and intra-executive conflict also to be much lower 
and the judgment about the regime type to be more positive. In other words, the 
study of semi-presidentialism has often suffered from a problem of selection 
bias. 
 In this context, we follow recent scholarship and propose a definition of 
semi-presidentialism that minimises the opportunity for variation in case 
selection from one writer to the next.9 We propose a definition based on a literal 
reading of the constitution rather than a subjective judgment about the powers of 
political actors. We define semi-presidentialism as: 
A regime where there is both a popularly-elected fixed-term 
president and a prime minister and cabinet responsible to the 
legislature. 
The advantage of this type of definition is that it includes the countries that are 
normally included in any study of semi-presidential regimes, such as France and 
Poland. At the same time, it establishes the the case selection as clearly as 
possible. In so doing, the potential for selection bias is minimised. Certainly, the 
nature of constitutional law is such that some judgment calls still have to be 
made. For example, in Slovakia the president can be removed from office by a 
plebiscite. As a result, arguably the fixed-term requirement is breached. 
However, we include Slovakia and countries like it because a super-majority is 
required in the plebiscite and because we feel there is a big enough difference 
between removal by plebiscite and removal by the legislature for cases such as 
Slovakia to be included. Another ambiguous case occurs in Argentina. Here, the 
head of the government is responsible to the legislature, but the cabinet is not. In 
this article, we exclude Argentina from the list of semi-presidential regimes 
because there is no collective responsibility. That said, Argentina is on the cusp 
of the definition and other writers may make a different judgment call. Finally, a 
number of problematic cases involve the situation where there may or may not 
be collective responsibility to the legislature. For example, in South Korea the 
prime minister is appointed with the consent of parliament, but parliament may  
then only recommend the removal of the prime minister and the president may 
decide to ignore the parliamentary vote. There are equivalent situations in 
countries like Azerbaijan and Mozambique. Here, we include these as cases of 
semi-presidentialism. We feel that even though the responsibility measures after 
the prime minister’s appointment are sometimes very weak, they are still 
different from the situation under a purely presidential system where the 
executive is never responsible to the legislature. Again, though, other writers 
may decide otherwise. 
 Overall, within these parameters, we calculate that there are currently 54 
semi-presidential regimes in the world. (See Figure 1). Clearly, some of these 
countries are unequivocally undemocratic and semi-presidentialism has always 
been a purely nominal affair. But what about semi-presidentialism in countries 
that have embarked on a process of democratisation? To what extent has semi-
presidentialism affected their progress? As we shall see in the next section, the 
scholarly consensus is that in these cases semi-presidentialism should have been 
an impediment to democratisation and for some quite explicit reasons. 
 
The consensus against semi-presidentialism 
 In comparison with the work on presidentialism and parliamentarism, there is 
much less scholarship on semi-presidentialism.10 That said, there is a general 
consensus within this scholarship that semi-presidentialism is essentially 
problematic and that young democracies should avoid choosing it.11 The 
opponents of semi-presidentialism identify three weakeness with this type of 
regime. 
 The first problem with semi-presidentialism is the same as one of the 
standard criticisms of presidentialism and concerns the impact of directly 
electing the president.12 The direct election of the head of state encourages the 
president to place himself/herself above politics. Presidents claim that they have 
a mandate from the people – no matter how close their winning margin may 
have been. This mandate, they believe, gives them the authority to act in the best 
interests of the country, as they see it. This can lead presidents to ignore the rule 
of law. In addition, a closely related argument suggests that direct election 
encourages political outsiders to seek election. If successful, such presidents tend 
to ignore political parties and personalise the presidential process. The survival 
of the regime becomes associated with the survival of the president in office. 
Opposition to the president becomes associated with opposition to the regime 
itself. 
 In the work on semi-presidentialsm, the perils of the direct election of the 
president have been noted. For example, when the president is supported by a 
loyal parliamentary majority Lijphart argues that mixed systems “actually make 
it possible for the president to be even more powerful that in most pure 
presidential systems”.13 For his part, Linz states that “as much or more than a 
pure presidential system, a dual executive system depends on the personality 
and abilities of the president”.14 Thus, semi-presidential systems may suffer from 
the same problem of a highly personalised political process as presidential 
systems. We will return to this issue in the conclusion. For the rest of this article 
though, we will focus on two other perils of semi-presidentalism because these 
objections are unique to this regime type. 
 The second problem with semi-presidentialism is the potential for conflict 
between the president and prime minister, especially during periods of 
‘cohabitation’, or the situation where the president is from one party or political 
grouping and the prime minister is from an opposed party or grouping. This is 
what Pierce identified as the executive “divided against itself”.15 
Under cohabitation, both the president and prime minister can 
legitimately claim that they have the authority to speak on behalf of the people.  
Therefore, neither actor can trump the authority of the other. In this context, the 
fact that the prime minister is responsible to the legislature means that the 
president has either to accept the will of the legislature and coexist with a 
political opponent or, if the constitution allows, to defy the legislature and 
dismiss the head of government in the knowledge the legislature may simply 
appoint as prime minister someone who is equally opposed to the president. The 
prospect of ongoing intra-executive conflict or a prime ministerial merry-go-
round until the next presidential or legislative election, and perhaps beyond, is a 
scenario that young democracies can well do without. It may lead to a gridlock 
situation in which neither the president nor the prime minister is willing to 
compromise and where the military intervenes in order to restore effective 
leadership authority. Alternatively, it may lead to one or other of the executive 
actors, usually the president, seizing power themselves so as to resolve the 
impasse. 
For Linz the result of cohabitation “inevitably is a lot of politicking and 
intrigues that may delay decision making and lead to contradictory policies due 
to the struggle between the president and prime minister”.16 Linz and Stepan are 
explicit about the dangers of cohabitation for young democracies: 
When supporters of one or the other component of semi-
presidentialism feel that the country would be better off if one 
branch of the democratically legitimated structure of rule would 
disappear or be closed, the democratic system is endangered and 
suffers an overall loss of legitimacy, since those questioning one or 
the other will tend to consider the political system undesirable as 
long as the side they favor does not prevail.17 
For their part, Stepan and Suleiman recommend against countries importing 
semi-presidentialism. They argue that semi-presidentialism “is a more risk-prone 
system than the modern parliamentarism that has evolved in Europe other than 
France after World War II”.18 
 The third problem with semi-presidentialism is the potential for divided 
minority government. This is a more recent criticism and is associated with the 
work of Cindy Skach. She calls this situation “semi-presidentialism’s most 
conflict-prone subtype”.19 She defines it as the case where “neither the president 
nor the prime minister, nor any party or coalition, enjoys a substantive majority 
in the legislature”.20 This, she says, “can predictably lead to an unstable scenario, 
characterized by shifting legislative coalitions and government reshuffles, on the 
one hand, and continuous presidential intervention and use of reserved powers, 
on the other”.21 Furthermore, this scenario can lead to a vicious circle: “The 
greater the legislative immobilism, governmental instability, and cabinet 
reshuffling resulting from the minority position of the government, the more 
justified or pressured the president may feel to use their powers beyond their 
constitutional limit, for a prolonged period of time”.22 For Skach, the prescription 
is very simple. In countries where party systems are not institutionalised, which 
would include most nascent democracies, “the argument for borrowing semi-
presidentialism has profound problems”. Indeed, she goes further and 
encourages countries that have already adopted semi-presidentialism to consider 
changing to parliamentarism: “It is time for Russia, along with many other 
fragile democracies that suffer from the semi-presidential predicament, to 
rethink its constitutional framework”.23 
 The literature on semi-presidentialism is unequivocal. This is a regime 
type that should be avoided. In this article, we focus on the two criticisms of 
semi-presidentialism that are unique to this regime type. Each criticism provides 
a very explicit hypothesis. Firstly, in young semi-presidential democracies 
cohabitation is likely to be associated with the collapse of democracy. Secondly, 
young semi-presidential democracies that experience divided minority 
government are likely to be prone to collapse. Somewhat surprisingly, to date, 
neither of these hypotheses has been systematically tested. There is anecdotal 
evidence of the perils of cohabitation, but no full-scale study of the impact of 
cohabitation has been undertaken. As for divided minority government, Skach 
has investigated the cases of France24 and Weimar Germany in detail and she has 
also linked the problems of democr
experience of divided minority government. Again, though, no systematic 
comparative study has been undertaken. In the next section, we examine the 
record of cohabitation and divided minority government under semi-
presidentialism. 
 
The impact of cohabitation and divided minority government: the method 
 
To test the impact of cohabitation and divided minority government, we first 
need to identify the set of countries that have operated under a semi-presidential 
system during the time when they have been engaged in a process of 
democratisation. If the existing literature is correct, then we would expect 
democracy in these countries to collapse if they experienced cohabitation and/or 
divided minority government. Various measures of democratization have been 
proposed. In this study, we rely on the classifications in the Polity IV dataset. 
This dataset provides codings of countries as more or less democratic from the 
early 19th century up to and including 2004. The Polity scale ranges from -10 
(complete autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy). There are various points in 
the scale over and above which the democratization process might realistically be 
considered to have begun. In this study, we assume that the process of 
democratization has begun in the year when a country moves from a score of 0 
or below to a score of +1 or more, or when a newly independent country scores 
+1 or more in the first year of its existence.25 Thus, evidence of democratic failure 
would be where a country that previously scored +1 or more is then given a 
score of 0 or lower. In addition, within the range of +1 to +10 we consider 
countries that score from +1 to +7 inclusive to be partial democracies and 
countries that score +8 or above to be full democracies.26 We expect partial 
democracies to be more susceptible to the problems of cohabitation and divided 
minority government than full democracies. 
 In a previous section, we identified 54 countries whose constitutions are 
currently semi-presidential. Some of these countries have never registered a 
score of +1 or more in the Polity database. We exclude all such countries, 
including Cameroon, Chad, Rwanda and Tajikistan among others, from the 
study. By contrast, we include some countries more than once. For example, 
Armenia scored +1 or more from 1991-95 inclusive. It then scored below +1 in 
1996 and 1997, only to register a score of +1 or more again from 1998-2004. In this 
case, we include two entries for Armenia, one of which corresponds to a process 
that failed (1991-95) and a second that did not (1998-2004, the date at which the 
data set ends). We also include a small number of countries that were semi-
presidential for a period, but subsequently abandoned this form of government 
in favour of another. Thus, we include Moldova, which was semi-presidential 
from 1991-2000 until a switch to parliamentarism and which scored +1 or more 
during this period. We also include the Comoros and Congo-Brazzaville, both of 
which were semi-presidential for much of the 1990s before they switched to a 
presidential system of government. We also include Cuba, which was semi-
presidential and registered a score of +1 or more from the time of the 1940 
Constitution until the collapse of democracy in 1951, as well as the more well-
know historical cases of Weimar Germany and First Republic Austria. Finally, 
we exclude four semi-presidential countries where the president is only a 
figurehead. These are: Austria since 1945, Ireland, Slovakia and Slovenia. We 
assume that the aforementioned criticisms of semi-presidentialism only apply 
when the president has at least some de facto executive power. In these four 
countries, the president has scarcely any powers. In practice, they have 
consistently operated as parliamentary-like systems. So, the criticisms of semi-
presidentialism are inappropriate. In total, we have 42 cases to examine.27 (See 
Figure 2 for the countries in the dataset). 
 Next, we identify the periods of cohabitation and divided minority 
government that have occurred in these cases. We began the process of 
identifying periods of cohabitation by consulting www.worldstatesmen.org/. 
This is a very thorough and reliable data source. It provides the names and terms 
of office of all presidents and prime ministers. It also records their party 
affiliation. We identified all cases when the party affiliation of the two executive 
actors was different. We then consulted secondary sources to confirm whether 
these instances were examples of coalition government, where the president and 
prime minister were from different parties but the same political alliance, or 
cohabitation, when they were from opposing parties and/or alliances. We 
identified periods of divided minority government by consulting the World 
Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI).28 This dataset has an entry called 
‘Majority’. The DPI codebook states that this entry records “the fraction of seats 
held by the government”. It is calculated by dividing the number of government 
seats by the total number of seats in the main house of the legislature. When the 
score for ‘Majority’ was below 50 per cent in a given year, we coded the case as a 
period of divided minority government. The DPI database only goes back to 
1975. This range covers most of our examples. For pre-1975 cases we use 
secondary sources to determine whether or not there was divided minority 
government. (The periods of cohabitation and divided minority government and 
the cases of democratic breakdown are recorded in Figure 2). In the next section, 
we report the findings of the study. 
 
The impact of cohabitation and divided minority government: the findings 
 
In countries that have scored +1 or more on the Polity scale while operating 
under a semi-presidential system, democracy has collapsed in 17 of the 42 cases 
(or 40 per cent).29 However, this figure may underestimate the perils of semi-
presidentialism. In six of the 42 cases a score below 8 on the Polity scale was 
never registered while they have been semi-presidential.30 Thus, they have 
always been classed as full democracies when operating under this type of 
system. If we assume that full democracies are much less likely to collapse and 
exclude them from the calculations, then we are left with 36 cases where semi-
presidentialism has operated in a country when it has been classed as a partial 
democracy.31 Democracy has collapsed in 17 of these 36 cases (or 47 per cent). We 
are not in a position to know how this figure compares with the equivalent 
figures for presidential and parliamentary regimes. Our aim is not to determine 
the relative merits of semi-presidentialism. Instead, here, we are solely interested 
in whether cohabitation and divided minority government have been associated 
with these examples of democratic failure. 
 
Cohabitation 
 
As regards cohabitation, the first point to note is that it has occurred in partial 
democracies only very rarely. Indeed, only three countries have experienced 
cohabitation when they have been in the range +1 to +7 inclusive. These are 
Niger (1995), Weimar Germany (1923-24 and 1927) and Sri Lanka (2002-2003). 
However, in two of these countries democracy collapsed. Therefore, even though 
cohabitation is very rare, when it does occur it would seem to be just about as 
perilous as the literature would suggest. That said, when we look more closely, 
the situation is not quite so clear-cut. 
 There is no doubt that in Niger cohabitation was directly responsible for 
the collapse of democracy. Here, in 1995 the incumbent president, Mahmane 
Ousmane, dissolved parliament prematurely. However, the subsequent election 
returned a majority opposed to him. When the new majority rejected the 
president’s choice of prime minister and elected the president’s opponent, Hama 
Amadou, there was an ongoing stand-off between the two parts of the executive. 
As one analyst put it: “both president and prime minister went ‘on strike’, 
refusing to carry out duties prescribed by the constitution for the normal 
functioning of the government, a near-total breakdown in constitutional 
procedures resulted”.32 For another observer, the “stand off between the 
president and the prime minister seriously discredited the democratic 
government and opened an opportunity for an authoritarian reversal”.33 In 
January 1996, the military stepped in and Niger’s first experiment with 
democracy came to an end. This is a textbook example of the perils of 
cohabitation under semi-presidentialism. While many other factors are no doubt 
associated with the collapse of democracy in Niger, including the country’s 
extreme poverty and lack of a democratic tradition, the experience of 
cohabitation was undeniably destabilising and certainly helped to bring about 
the military coup in 1996. 
At first glance, the situation in Weimar Germany would seem to confirm 
the Nigerien experience. However, this situation needs more exploration. In 
Weimar Germany, there were four periods of cohabitation.34 The first was from 
21 November 1922 to 5 October 1923. The second was from 3 June 1924 to 14 
January 1925. The third was from 20 January to 16 May 1926. The fourth was 
from 29 January 1927 to 28 June 1928.35 Thus, cohabitation would seem to be 
associated with democratic failure. However, given that Weimar Germany is 
classed as a partial democracy by Polity until 1934 and that the last period of 
cohabitation was in 1928, it is not clear that cohabitation can be directly 
associated with the breakdown of democracy. Indeed, Skach focuses on the 
problems of divided minority government as a more important reason for the 
collapse of Weimar. 36  
In addition, the recent situation in Sri Lanka would seem to disconfirm the 
standard wisdom. Here, the country recently experienced a period of 
cohabitation without democracy collapsing. In December 1999 Chandrika 
Kumaratunga of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party was re-elected as president. 
However, in December 2001 parliamentary elections returned a majority for the 
United National Party (UNP) and President Kumaratunga appointed Ranil 
Wickremasinghe of the UNP as prime minister. The president and prime 
minister clashed repeatedly over the handling of a peace agreement with the 
Tamil Tigers.37 These tensions came to a head when President Kumaratunga 
dismissed the Wickremasinghe government in February 2004 and early 
parliamentary elections were held in April. In the elections, the president’s 
coalition was returned as the largest grouping and the period of cohabitation 
ended. There is no doubt that Sri Lanka’s experience of cohabitation was 
extremely difficult, but democracy survived. Indeed, in the two years of 
cohabitation Polity recorded a slightly improved score of 6 from 5 previously. 
These examples suggest that cohabitation is perhaps not as problematic as 
standard the literature would suggest. The predictions of that literature do 
capture the 1995 events in Niger extremely well. However, they are much less 
successful at capturing the impact of cohabitation in Weimar Germany and, 
particularly, Sri Lanka. In the latter case, the predictions of rivalry between the 
president and prime minister were certainly correct, but democracy survived. In 
other words, even partial democracies may well be robust enough to cope with 
intra-executive tensions. 
In full democracies (those that score +8 or more on the Polity scale), the 
situation is very clear. Here, cohabitation has occurred much more frequently 
and, when it has occurred, it has never been associated even indirectly with the 
either the collapse of democracy or a decline in the Polity score to below +8 (i.e., 
a decline from a full democracy to a partial democracy). Indeed, there are a 
number of key examples showing that even very young full democracies can 
survive periods of cohabitation. For example, Macedonia, and Mongolia 
experienced cohabitation just a year after they were first classed as full 
democracies. Poland and Bulgaria experienced cohabitation three years after 
they were first classed as full democracies.38 In short, full democracies have 
always coped perfectly well with cohabitation. Arguably, this is true even when 
it has occurred at a time when a decline in the status of democracy was entirely 
possible. 
In this regard, the example of Mongolia is worth exploring a little more 
fully. The transition to democracy began, naturally enough, in 1989-90. The first 
multi-party elections were held in July 1990. The current semi-presidential 
constitution was ratified by the Mongolian parliament on 13 January 1992. The 
Polity scores for Mongolia are -7 in 1989, 2 in 1990 and 1991, 9 from 1992-95 and 
10 since 1996. Thus, the introduction of semi-presidentialism corresponds to the 
first year of full democracy. In the June 1992 legislative elections, the Mongolian 
People’s Revolutionary Party won 85 per cent of the seats in the Great Hural. In 
June 1993, Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat from the Mongolian National Democratic 
Party (MNDP) was elected as president, so beginning a period of cohabitation 
that lasted until the victory of the MNDP-led coalition in the June 1996 legislative 
elections. Arguably, even though Mongolia is classed as a full democracy during 
the whole of this period, the survival of this status was not necessarily 
guaranteed. In other words, it is reasonable to suggest that the country may have 
slipped back to the status of a partial democracy or worse. For example, 
Mongolia was suffering from a bout of hyperinflation and it is estimated that the 
collapse of Soviet subsidies meant that in 1991 the country lost around half of its 
gross national product.39 In addition, Mongolia had no tradition of democracy to 
rely upon. In all, even though Fish argues that Mongolia did not suffer from 
some of the problems that beset many equivalent post-Soviet countries,40 there 
seems to be nothing inevitable about the maintenance of full democracy during 
the early years of the transition. If Mongolia’s status as a full democracy was 
under threat at this time, then the standard literature would suggest that 
cohabitation would be problematic in this regard. Even so, Mongolia’s status as a 
full democracy survived and was consolidated. We do not necessarily have to 
agree with Fish that cohabitation actually helped Mongolia, but if the survival of 
democracy was not inevitable then we can argue, once again, that the perils of 
cohabitation are exaggerated. 
Overall, partial democracies with a semi-presidential form of government 
have collapsed 17 times. Only one collapse is directly associated with 
cohabitation. That said, cohabitation has been an extremely rare phenomenon in 
partial democracies. Thus, the best we can say in support of the standard 
wisdom is that there is some evidence to back up the argument about the perils 
of cohabitation, but the jury is still out until we have the evidence from more 
cases. By contrast, if we weaken our assumptions somewhat and allow for the 
possibility that the status of full democracies is not necessarily guaranteed at 
least in the first few years of their existence, then we can say that cohabitation is 
scarcely perilous at all. In this case, the evidence suggests that the standard 
wisdom exaggerates the problems caused by cohabitation under semi-
presidentialism. 
 
Divided minority government 
 
In contrast to cohabitation the record of divided minority government is 
unequivocally worse. We find that divided minority government was clearly 
associated with the breakdown of democracy in five of the 17 cases in our 
dataset.  They are: Armenia (1991-95), Belarus, Burkina Faso, Cuba and Weimar 
Germany. These cases confirm the predictions that Skach makes about the perils 
of divided minority government and most cases neatly parallel the events in 
Weimar Germany that she studied in depth. For example, in Belarus the first 
multi-party elections for the Supreme Council of the Belarus Soviet Socialist 
Republic were held in March 1990 and the Communist Party of Belarus obtained 
a large majority. In August 1991 Belarus declared independence. In early 1994 a 
new semi-presidential constitution was adopted by a referendum. In July 1994 
Aleksandr Lukashenko was directly elected as president. By this time, the 
majority in parliament was fractured, leaving the government without a formal 
majority. President Lukashenko issued executive decrees to assert his control 
over the regime. He also used his power to call a referendum to increase his 
authority over parliament. In May 1995 voters approved the following question: 
‘Do you agree to the need to amend the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus in 
order to provide for the possibility of an early termination of the Supreme 
Council by the President of the Republic of Belarus in case of systematic or major 
violations of the Constitution?’41 In terms of Polity IV, Belarus scores +7 from 
1991-1994, but declines to 0 in 1995 and -7 thereafter. Therefore, the evidence 
suggests that Skach’s conviction about divided minority government being 
“semi-presidentialism’s most conflict-prone subtype” is accurate. 
That said, there is evidence that divided minority government is not 
necessarily fatal to new democracies. In five cases partial democracies have 
experienced divided minority government and have not collapsed. They are: 
Finland (1932-36), Madagascar (1998 and 2002), Russia (1994 and 1997-2003),42 
South Korea (1988-92) and Ukraine (1995-2004).43 All the same, many of these 
examples support Skach’s argument about the problems associated with the 
dynamics of divided minority government. In Madagascar, Russia and Ukraine, 
the strength of the president has increased over time. In Madagascar the 
constitution was amended in 1998 to reinforce the president’s power. In Russia 
and Ukraine, presidents have resorted to rule by decree in a way that neatly 
confirms Skach’s predictions about the effect of divided minority government. 
Indeed, in Russia democracy is currently very fragile indeed and in Ukraine 
democracy was only saved following the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2005. Overall, 
these examples do show that partial democracies can survive divided minority 
government and suggest that it is not an inherently perilous situation, but they 
also indicate that the basic intuition about the dangerous personalisation of the 
political process under divided minority government does seem to hold true. 
As with cohabitation, the situation in full democracies is quite different. In 
these regimes, divided minority government has occurred quite frequently and it 
has never been associated with a decline in the status of the country from a full to 
a partial democracy or worse. The closest case that corresponds to this situation 
is First Republic Austria. Here, the December 1929 constitution introduced a 
semi-presidential system by creating the direct election of the president. In the 
period 1930-32, there were two minority governments: Karl Vaugoin from 30 
September to 4 December 1930, and Karl Buresch II from 29 January to 20 May 
1932. In addition, the government of Engelbert Dolfuß that immediately followed 
Buresch II began life as a majority government, but was in a minority situation 
by the time Dolfuß dissolved parliament and began to rule by decree in March 
1933. From 1930-32 inclusive Polity IV scores Austria at +8. In 1933 it scores -88, 
which is how Polity IV score a transition year. In 1934 it scores -9. Thus, the 
Austrian case would also seem to support Skach’s argument about the perils of 
divided minority government. However, this case is somewhat unusual. In the 
first place, no presidential election was held before the collapse of democracy in 
1933. Moreover, the 1929 constitution gave the president relatively few powers. 
The responsibility for decision-making lay with the head of government. 
Consequently, the collapse of democracy is associated with the actions of Dolfuß 
as Chancellor, rather than Wilhelm Miklas as president. Also, there was no 
substantial period of divided minority government before the collapse of 
democracy. So, the Austrian example provides some support for Skach’s thesis, 
but not unequivocal support. 
Finally, while we would expect long-standing full democracies, like 
France from 1988-92, to survive periods of divided minority government 
perfectly well, we might expect countries that have only just achieved the status 
of full democracy to decline if the perils of divided minority government are so 
great. However, this has not been the case. For example, Peru experienced a 
period of divided minority government immediately after the resumption of full 
democracy in 2001. Poland experienced divided minority government from 1991-
92 at the start of the transition process and when the party system was very 
fragmented, even though the country was classed as a full democracy at the time. 
Romania experienced divided minority government after just one year of being 
classed as a full democracy. Equally, Senegal also experienced a period of 
divided minority government just a year after being classed as a full democracy. 
Thus, even if divided minority government is semi-presidentialism’s most 
conflict-prone sub-type, it has had little impact on full democracies even in cases 
where party systems are still fragmented in new democracies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this article was to establish whether the main arguments made 
against semi-presidentialism stand up to empirical scrutiny. There is one very 
clear finding in this regard: there is insufficient evidence to make the claim that 
cohabitation is perilous under semi-presidentialism. Perhaps the most striking 
result from the empirics is that Niger is the only country where cohabitation has 
ever been directly responsible for the collapse of democracy. It is plausible to 
argue that cohabitation contributed to the collapse of democracy in Weimar 
Germany, but other factors, including divided minority government, were much 
more influential. So, Niger is the only example that can yet be cited by the 
opponents of semi-presidentialism in support of their claims about the perils of 
cohabitation. In a sense, we should not be surprised about this finding. In the 
literature on democratization from the early 1990s when the standard argument 
was made, the perils of cohabitation were discussed almost exclusively in the 
context of the then still recent French experience from 1986-88 and the Polish 
experience in the early 1990s. Writers such as Linz and Stepan found, quite 
rightly, that the experience of cohabitation in these countries was politically 
controversial and traumatic. From these examples, they inferred that if 
cohabitation were to occur in a nascent democracy, then it would be dangerous 
for the process of democratization. In short, the standard wisdom about the 
negative effects of cohabitation was never based on empirical observation. We 
have shown that the standard wisdom has yet to be proven empirically. The 
Niger example proves that the predictions of writers such as Linz and Stepan 
were right. However, the Sri Lanka case and, arguably, the Weimar case also 
prove that they were not always right. Moreover, we have shown that full 
democracies have managed to survive cohabitation without any change in their 
status, even if it has occurred in the very early years of the democratisation 
process. Overall, while it may be true to say that cohabitation is inefficient and 
undesirable, we cannot say that it is dangerous for democracy just yet. We need 
more examples before we can draw any such conclusion. 
 The situation with regard to the perils of divided minority government is 
slightly different. There are more cases of divided minority government than 
cohabitation and more cases where divided minority government has been 
associated more or less directly with the breakdown of democracy. Thus, Skach 
is right to have drawn our attention to divided minority government as the most 
conflict-prone sub-type of semi-presidentialism. All the same, we have also 
shown that divided minority government is not necessarily fatal for partial 
democracies and that full democracies, with the possible exception of the 
Austrian First Republic, have always managed to survive divided minority 
government even if it has occurred in the earliest years of the transition process. 
In her work, Skach has argued that the perils of divided minority 
government are associated with the fragmentation of nascent party systems. The 
lack of cohesive majorities is said to encourage presidents to rule by decree, thus 
endangering the prospects of democratic survival. We have shown that partial 
democracies and fledgling full democracies have survived divided minority 
government even when the party system has been fragmented. So, by itself, 
variations in party politics do not seem to explain why divided minority 
government causes some democracies to collapse but not others. As a way 
forward, we suggest that it might be useful to explore the interaction of semi-
presidential regimes in which the president is a strong political actor and divided 
minority government. It may be the case that divided minority government does 
not cause presidents to become more powerful so threatening democracy. It may 
be that divided minority government is dangerous in cases where presidents are 
already powerful. This hypothesis is one that might usefully be tested in future 
work on the topic. 
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Figure 1 List of semi-presidential countries and their democratic status in 
2003 
 
Algeria (autocracy) 
Angola (autocracy) 
Armenia (partial 
democracy) 
Austria (democracy) 
Azerbaijan (autocracy) 
Belarus (autocracy) 
Bulgaria (democracy) 
Burkina Faso (autocracy) 
Cameroon (autocracy) 
Cape Verde (democracy)1 
Central African Republic 
(autocracy) 
Chad (autocracy) 
Croatia (partial 
democracy) 
Egypt (autocracy) 
Finland (democracy) 
France (democracy) 
Gabon (autocracy) 
Guinea-Bissau 
Iceland (democracy) 
Ireland (democracy) 
Kazakhstan (autocracy) 
Kyrgyzstan (autocracy) 
Lithuania (democracy) 
Macedonia (democracy) 
Madagascar (partial 
democracy) 
Mali (partial democracy) 
Mauritania (autocracy) 
Mongolia (democracy) 
Mozambique (partial 
democracy) 
Namibia (partial 
democracy) 
Niger (partial 
democracy) 
Peru (democracy) 
Poland (democracy) 
Portugal (democracy) 
Romania (democracy) 
Rwanda (autocracy) 
Sao Tome e Principe 
(democracy)1 
Senegal (democracy) 
Singapore (autocracy) 
Slovakia (democracy) 
Slovenia (democracy) 
South Korea (democracy) 
Sri Lanka (partial 
democracy) 
Taiwan (democracy) 
Tajikistan (autocracy) 
Tanzania (partial 
democracy) 
Timor-Leste (partial 
democracy) 
Togo (autocracy) 
Tunisia (autocracy) 
Ukraine (partial 
democracy) 
Uzbekistan (autocracy) 
(autocracy) 
Haiti (autocracy) 
Russia (partial 
democracy) 
Yemen (autocracy) 
 
Source Polity IV (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/): Democratic status as of 
2003: -10 to 0 (autocracy); +1 to +7 (partial democracy); +8 to 10 (full democracy) 
1 Not scored by Polity IV 
Figure 2 Cases of cohabitation and divided minority government under 
partial and full semi-presidential democracies to 2004 
 
Country (Polity IV score of +1 or 
more when semi-presidential) 
Cohabitation DMG 
Collapse of 
democracy? 
(move from 
a Polity IV 
score of +1 
or more to 0 
or less) 
Armenia (1991-95)  1992-95 Yes 
Armenia (1998-)    
Austria (1929-32)   Yes 
Azerbaijan (1992)   Yes 
Belarus (1994)  1994 Yes 
Bulgaria (1992-) 
1995-96, 
2001-2005 
  
Burkina Faso (1978-79)  1979 Yes 
Central African Republic (1993-2002)   Yes 
Comoros (1992-94)   Yes 
Comoros (1996-98)   Yes 
Congo Brazzaville (1992-96)   Yes 
Croatia (1999-)  2004  
Cuba (1940-51)  1944-45 Yes 
East Timor (2002-)    
Finland (1919-) 
1946-55, 
1991-94 
1919, 1921-
29, 1932-36, 
1949-50, 
1957, 1959-
61, 1972, 
1977 
 
France (1962-) 
1986-87. 
1993-94, 
1997-2001 
1988-92  
Germany (1919-33) 1923-24, 1927 
1920-22, 
1925-26, 
1928-29 
Yes 
Guinea-Bissau (1994-97)   Yes 
Guinea-Bissau (2001-02)   Yes 
Haiti (1994-99)   Yes 
Lithuania (1992-) 1997, 2003 
1997, 2001-
2003 
 
Macedonia (1992-) 2003   
Madagascar (1991-)  
1997-98, 
2002 
 
Mali (1992-)    
Moldova (1991-2000)    
Mongolia (1992-) 
1993-95, 
1997-2000 
1997-2000  
Mozambique (1994-)    
Namibia (1990-)    
Niger (1992-95) 1995  Yes 
Niger (1999-)    
Peru (1979-91)   Yes 
Peru (1993-99)   Yes 
Peru (2001-)  2001-04  
Poland (1990-) 
1992-95, 
1997-2000 
1992, 1998-
2001 
 
Portugal (1976-) 
1988-95, 
2002-2006 
1986-87, 
1996-99 
 
Romania (1990-)  1997-2004  
Russia (1992-)  
1994, 1997-
2003 
 
Senegal (2000-)  2001  
South Korea (1988-)  1988-92,  
1997-2004 
Sri Lanka (1978-) 2002-2003 2002-2004  
Tanzania (2000-)    
Ukraine (1991-)  1995-2004  
 
